


*The urgent necessity to update  
the catalogue of radicalization dynamics  
and the policies aimed at countering them,  
in a context of global power rivalry*

Łukasz Jurczyszyn



# C O L L E G I U M   C I V I T A S

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The urgent necessity  
to update the catalogue of radicalization dynamics  
and the policies aimed at countering them,  
in a context of global power rivalry

Łukasz Jurczyszyn

Abstract

The article is based, firstly, on the results of the largest study so far (in geographic and empirical terms) accredited by the European Commission, devoted precisely to two types of radicalization – far-right and Islamist – as well as anti-terrorist and anti-radicalization policies in the EU. This unique research program – the Dialogue About Radicalization and Equality (DARE) – took place between 2017 and 2021 and involved around 40 researchers from 13 countries, including Russia. Secondly, the article is based on text, orchestrated together by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights and Collegium Civitas University: Significance and Reactions to the Polish Independence Day March in Wrocław, 11 November 2018.

One of the key outcomes on above research projects is that we should include within the basket of different types of radicalization processes broader set ideologies: behaviors that radicalization encompasses – this is extremely important currently – framed by the power state rivalry (mostly between the USA/European Union and Russia/China). That's why there is an urgent need that both the EU and NATO should (and their proper new strategies illustrate) react, by designing their specific policy of countering the form of radicalization linked to the hybrid warfare.

Keywords

counter-radicalisation policy, nationalist and Islamist radicalisation, hybrid and terrorist threats, EU, NATO

## Introduction

This article is mostly based on the results of the largest study so far (in geographic and empirical terms) accredited by the European Commission, devoted precisely to two types of radicalization – far-right and Islamist – as well as anti-terrorist and anti-radicalization policies in the EU. This unique research program – the Dialogue About Radicalization and Equality (DARE) – took place between 2017 and 2021 and involved around 40 researchers from 13 countries, including Russia.<sup>1</sup> Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used, including 1) three-year participant observations and in-depth interviews conducted in 10 countries with approximately 400 people who had already been radicalized or were on the road to being so; 2) an online survey (sample 5,000); 3) analysis / recommendations based on over 100 policies / programs / strategies from 16 countries; 4) in-depth interviews with 25 experts and EU and national officials/practitioners from 14 countries; 5) qualitative analysis of existing data from about 200 monographs and other publications; 6) qualitative research on social media; 7) development of an EU tool for the self-evaluation of the deradicalization program; 8) production of an educational documentary based on in-depth interviews, and its distribution in schools in the countries covered by the study; and 9) two workshops with the participation of practitioners in the area of counter-radicalization policy and families affected by Islamization and extreme-right ideology.

One of the main tasks of the Polish team (formed at Collegium Civitas University) was the synthesis and critical assessment of over 100 counterterrorism policies and deradicalization programs in the EU, as well as in Russia, Norway, Turkey, and Tunisia. This was presented in two volumes: 1) the *Report on the Comparative Analysis of European Counter-*

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<sup>1</sup> The author of this article was a DARE coordinator for Poland on behalf of the Collegium Civitas University, serving as a member of the board of this research program. To consult the full list of its partners, please use the following link: <https://www.dare-h2020.org/partners.html>.

*Radicalization, Counter-Terrorist and De-Radicalization Policies*, July 2, DARE, 2019 European Commission Publication (90 p.); and 2) the *Methodological/Technical Appendix* (101 p.). Although the DARE research program has been finalized, its results, conclusions, and most of all, its recommendations are all still particularly fresh and relevant. Some of them have been incorporated into this article.

Another key project on which this article is based was orchestrated together by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights and Collegium Civitas University: *Significance and Reactions to the Polish Independence Day March in Wrocław, 11 November 2018*, published in November 2019 (Jurczyszyn, Stefański 2019). It should be noted that this report was the result of a suggestion put forward by the Social Council of the Commissioner for Human Rights in Wrocław: its members raised serious concerns about the behavior of participants in the Polish Independence Day March of November 11, 2018. They called attention to the increasingly frequent use of violence and incitement to ideological and ethnic hatred by the event's participants (mostly regarding rising hate against members of the Ukrainian minority). In addition, the Council noted the problem of radical nationalist groups operating in the city's public space and the need to consider whether to outlaw them. They, therefore, recommended preparing a report.

For this purpose, researchers (including the author of this article) conducted a field study. The first interviews allowed us to observe the "social shock" that was triggered by the "evening" march of November 11, 2018, in Wrocław. This shock stemmed less from the actual degradation of the situation – for example, any drastic increase in hate-motivated physical violence – than from the damage to the city's image and a conviction that a "turning point" had been reached, which necessitated an "appropriate reaction" to the increased activity of nationalist groups.

The first interviews made it evident that in multicultural Wrocław (European Capital of Culture, etc.), the several thousand participants in

the Polish Independence Day March, and the accompanying physical violence and slogans such as “The city is ruled by a Jew in a yarmulke,” “Oppose the dictates of Brussels,” “Anti-Banderite Poland,” and “We remember Volhynia” (the latter two are anti-Ukrainian), aroused significant social opposition. Coupled with another turning-point event, this time at the national level – the murder of Gdańsk mayor Paweł Adamowicz – quite a few respondents expressed fears that something “bad may happen in the city;” for example, “a bloodier confrontation” that “may slip out of the city’s control.”

As a result, the exploratory research had a fundamental impact on the research methodology. It helped the study’s authors to realize that the problem was not only the march itself or counter-marches (in the sense of violent outcomes, when the march’s participants became victims of some radical nationalists), but its status as a litmus test for increasing negative tendencies “around the marchers.” This is also linked to external factors such as the Ukrainian minority, which has been constantly growing as a result of the Russian military aggression in Donbas. In view of the above, as a result of last year’s march, the city authorities decided that now was “the right moment” to take new, more decisive action; for example, to think about a “real,” “more in-depth,” “less bureaucratic” strategy to counteract ethnic tensions and nationalist ideology.

The third main source for this text is several analyzes and observations produced by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), a think-tank, in the frame of the author’s tasks as a counselor on hybrid threats and a member of ISEG at NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division.

### Up-to-date catalogue of radicalization dynamics

I state in this paper that based on key conclusions from the DARE research and other quoted documents, we should include within the basket of different types of radicalization processes broader set ideologies:

behaviors that radicalization encompasses – this is extremely important currently – framed by the power state rivalry (mostly between the USA/European Union and Russia/China) (Jurczyszyn, Liedel, Pacewicz, Piasecka 2019).

From the DARE research, we can observe several key socioeconomic and political changes that have already modified, and will doubtless continue to modify, both the overall landscape and possible roots of the radicalization process in Europe.

Firstly, the COVID19-related pandemic, which has exacerbated the socioeconomic inequalities that – as DARE research has proved – are the main cause of the radicalization process. Our researchers involved in the different tasks mentioned above have all demonstrated that radicalization is a societal phenomenon,<sup>2</sup> and the pandemic will result in the rise of social frustrations not only related to such factors as social deprivation, unemployment, or homelessness. They will also be linked to violent differentiations in the facility of access to health systems and work; divided between those who can do their jobs remotely vs those who can work only in a specific place, or between those who can or cannot afford medical treatment. Already available sources have shown that those who were already the poorest, and ethnic minorities, have lost most economically because of the pandemic. There is also the rise in Internet use by “shut-in” citizens during the pandemic; as DARE research has stated, social media has a strong impact in particular on young people’s vision of the world and thus contributes to generating radical – both Islamist and far-right – beliefs. The pandemic, which is far from finished, may contribute to this negative tendency.

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<sup>2</sup> For the Polish DARE Team, for instance, 93% of the analyzed documents included varied provisions in this category. Radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are processes inherently social in nature; policies should take a societal and educational approach to countering these threats (At EU – European Fair Skills – Deradicalization. Training for Peer Role Models and Youth Workers 2015, and the national Spanish strategy – Comprehensive Strategy Against International Terrorism and Radicalization (EICTIR) of 2010, implemented 2012).

However, it is important not to overestimate the influence of such new media; this was also emphasized in the DARE project. For instance, in in-depth interviews, experts noted a growing lack of trust in content and tools encountered on the Internet among youth. This should be developed via more offline interactions with and between young people through community cohesion programs and exchanges (youth centres, community meetings, etc.).

As stated in our research, no social or political entity exists fully autonomously; thus, it is important to take into account the external realities surrounding the analysed subject. This fact is all the more important in the current era of heightened mobility, migration, and the rise of so-called geopolitical risks and dynamics, including interference by foreign radicalized actors/fighters, terrorists, and hybrid agents of global powers in Europe. More precisely, external factors that influence radicalization processes in Europe include the return of individuals and families from conflict areas, the threat of foreign fighters, attacks perpetrated by external terrorist organizations, radical Islamist propaganda, developments in conflict zones, and threats from conflicts in the Middle East.

These issues were recognized as important in the majority (54%) of the policy documents analysed in the DARE report. Without some awareness of the influence of these factors, counter-radicalization efforts in Europe will be flawed. Expert interviewees identified similar factors contributing to the perception of an external threat: the influence/actions of so-called ISIS foreign fighters and other European citizens (and their children), returning mainly from Syria; and the spillover effect of tensions into European countries, through diaspora from conflict-torn regions and other diverse non-diaspora support groups (Jurczyszyn, Liedel, Pacewicz, Piasecka 2019: 46).

The interplay between internal and external tensions was studied closely in Wrocław, in the case of the integration efforts of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. This could represent a hybrid threat, not only to the



Polish internal security system but also those of the EU and NATO. We have noticed that there has been an increase in racist and nationalist tendencies in Polish society in the face of major demographic changes – in particular, the large-scale immigration from Ukraine, particularly to Wrocław. One factor is that plenty of young people harbour doubts and ask questions about the future scale and limits to local integration of immigrants in general and the Ukrainian community in particular. According to statistics, there are approximately 110,000 Ukrainians in Wrocław; a large influx, especially over the past eight years, has caused this minority to become the largest minority community, percentage-wise, in any Polish city. The study found worries and concerns in the minds of some residents about mass immigration from this country (Jurczyszyn, Stefański 2019).

These have been exploited by nationalist groups. Many interviewees wanted to know whether the city authorities had the immigration process “under control,” and whether they were keeping track of conflicts and “problematic” immigrants. They also asked questions about the extent and manner in which the immigrants were being integrated into the life of the city. Studies published in recent years have found that Ukrainians are perceived positively by Poles, especially in contrast to immigrants from Muslim countries (particularly Muslim refugees). But the “fuel” for extreme ideologies was the “mass” character of the migration and the undesirable competition it adds to the local labor market, as well as the difficult historic relations between the two countries, including the Volhynia Massacre.

In this context, another key new dynamic of the radicalization process that could trigger a hybrid threat by a foreign state power has been called the “weaponization of migrants.” In our research, we focused on the major migration crisis that occurred in Europe between 2015 and 2018. One of its outcomes was a rise in xenophobia among an important segment of European citizens. Another fact linked to this situation was the flow of some Islamist terrorists who used refugee channels to reach

the EU (some of them organized terrorist attacks, as in the Parisian *Bataclan* in November 2015). Dozens of similar Islamist acts of terror contributed to a significant growth in Islamophobia and far-right ideology.

However, since then, we have been witnessing another form of the migration phenomenon: a type of hybrid attack by a hostile government organizing, or threatening to organize, a sudden influx of refugees into another country with the intent of overwhelming its borders or causing political destabilization, including sociopolitical polarization that could lead to radicalization and violence. This often exploits the targeted country's humanitarian obligations to take in refugees and assess their asylum claims. The responsible country (or sometimes a non-state actor) usually seeks to extract concessions from the targeted country and achieve some political, military, and/or economic objective. For the last six months, we have had such a situation on the border between Poland (i.e., the EU) and Belarus.

More precisely, the Belarusian services have been constantly funneling (via flights from countries like Syria and Iraq) large numbers of migrants to their border, mostly heading for Germany and the Netherlands (in Belarus there are at least 7,000 according to the Belarusian authorities, up to 16,000 according to independent estimates). This is intended to increase tensions and put pressure on the Polish and Lithuanian security services operating on the border. These actions, aimed at provoking a serious humanitarian crisis and destabilizing the security situation at the EU's eastern edge, represent a test for Poland, the EU, and NATO's ability to protect their borders. As a result, the Polish government has decided to deploy 20,000 troops and construct a reinforced wall. Importantly, the EU has recently agreed to impose on Belarus a new, wider raft of sanctions over this crisis.

However, the conflict is likely to continue, and we can expect the approaching winter to worsen the gravity of the situation. What is certain is that this strategy of "weaponizing of migrants" has proved to be effective and could be used in other national/international contexts. For

instance, a similar situation could be initiated by Russia on another EU border between Finland and the Russian Federation (around 1300 km in length). This will be even more probable once Finland (together with Sweden) becomes a NATO member.

This crucial point is also linked to another, especially currently relevant dynamic – the role of hostile third countries aiming to destabilize the EU and NATO. At NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division we have noticed a worldwide growth in such phenomena as ideological / socio / political polarization and radicalization as a new hybrid warfare, used particularly by such countries as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Therefore, we should – in line with DARE’s main recommendation – take into account the broad range of ideologies and behaviors that radicalization encompasses, as well as the process of cumulative radicalization. In addition to the individual/subjective level of the radicalization process, deeply studied in DARE research, and the so-called “meso-level” (pathways, families, groups, neighborhoods/cities, organizations, and institutions, etc.), we need to emphasize the international context in the form of the most hostile and disruptive tactics used by one country/organization against another. These include illegal financing of radical groups, disinformation, terrorism, and other insurgency actions. We should also take into account the chaotic and unsuccessful withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan, which resulted in the Taliban’s rapid return to power in the country. It is possible to forecast that this will increase the terrorist threat in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which may lead to a greater terrorist threat in the Middle East and Europe.

Of all the conflicts in the post-Soviet area, the war in Ukraine since 2014 has seen the greatest participation by foreign fighters. It is estimated that more than 17,000 fighters from 55 countries have fought there on either side. Those fighting on the Russian side pose a special challenge to Ukraine’s security and to that of neighboring countries, because these fighters may engage in terrorism or other radical actions and are part of Russia’s hybrid warfare. So far, we have no data on this

for the period since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fighters' motivations have included various ideologies, historical memories (grievances), political attitudes, nationalism, and ethnic or religious factors. Even on opposite sides, some fighters have held similar views, such as pan-Slavism, far-right ideology, racism, or fascination with authoritarian systems (Legieć 2019).

Certain formations such as the Azov Regiment, Aidar Battalion, Donbas Battalion, and Right Sector have played a significant role in the fight against pro-Russia separatists. While foreign fighters themselves have had limited impact on the course of the conflict (only amounting to about 1% of those involved in the fighting), their experience has been important for recruiting new volunteers and for conducting paramilitary training, intelligence operations, and propaganda activities. Units in which foreign fighters participated were not part of the chain of command of the Ukrainian armed forces; this gave them broad freedom of action. Some which drew on neo-Nazi ideology developed contacts with other radical organizations in Europe (e.g., the British National Action, the German National Democratic Party, the Italian CasaPound, and the Polish Stormtroopers), organizing training, conducting propaganda activities, and recruiting other fighters in Ukraine and abroad. For example, the Azov Regiment recruited volunteers during neo-Nazi festivals in the UK and Germany (*Ibidem*).

Arkadiusz Legieć – PISM's principal specialist on terrorism and hybrid threats – emphasizes that in order to limit the threats related to paramilitary forces, these units were subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior or Ministry of Defense, or incorporated into the National Guard. Initially, not all agreed and some were dissolved, but some retained broad autonomy, only coordinating their activities with Ukraine's army (this included the Right Sector and formations subordinated to it that contained foreign fighters) (*Ibidem*).

Stimulation of the inflow of foreign fighters has become a permanent element of hybrid operations conducted by Russia, including in other

countries. Foreign fighters from Ukraine – sometimes also those fighting on the Ukrainian side – have been recruited by Russian PMCs, including the famous Wagner Group. As mercenaries, they have taken part in other conflicts, including in Syria, Libya, Sudan, Central Africa, and Mozambique. Russian security services – notably, the special unit GRU 29155 – have used foreign fighters for subversive activities and as agents of influence in other countries, including the preparation of a coup in Montenegro in 2016.

Foreign fighters on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine have taken part in subsequent conflicts, including fighting on the side of the Kurds against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, or working as mercenaries. Some have also been involved in radical activities in their own countries (e.g., militant activity within the yellow-vest protests in Paris, which started in 2018), building radical organizations, or trading arms on EU territory. On July 15, 2022, Italian police, investigating far-right groups with fighters who had been in Ukraine, arrested three suspects. They discovered an arsenal intended for sale to Libya, including an air-to-air missile, 26 firearms, and 20 bayonets. Foreign fighters have also engaged in terrorist activities: the perpetrator of the attacks on March 15 in Christchurch, New Zealand, had been involved in the conflict in Ukraine (*Ibidem*).

Conflicts involving foreign fighters in the EU's neighborhood are a special security challenge because they attract radicals from around the world who then make further contacts, with some engaging in terrorist activities or becoming instruments of destabilization, prompted by Russia. The inflow of foreign fighters to Ukraine will continue as long as the conflict persists, thanks to existing channels of mobilization, established personal relationships, and autonomy for formations open to foreign fighter participation (e.g., the Right Sector).

What is more, the Russian military leadership is likely to increasingly link Ukrainian partisan military attacks – in Crimea, for instance – with operations conducted by organizations affiliated with Islamist extremism. Most often they blame the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization – an Islamist

fundamentalist group, banned in Russia, that has historically been active in Central Asia and Crimea amongst the Crimean Tatar community. This seems to represent an attempt to alienate the Ukrainian partisan movement from the international community and undermine Ukraine's calls to officially designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, in reality, attacks against legitimate Russian military targets fall well within the purview of legal use of force and are not acts of terrorism, nor is there any evidence to suggest that Islamist extremists conducted these attacks.

### Countering new hybrid threats linked to the radicalization and terrorist challenges

Since 2016, the EU has been mobilizing its resources and creating new instruments to combat hybrid threats. These actions are the Union's main response to the destabilizing activities of Russia and China, as well as smaller states such as Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. The EU also includes the activities of terrorist organizations and extremist groups in the catalog of such threats. Its efforts to date have focused on combating disinformation and propaganda and strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure against cyberattacks. In the "brand new" EU Strategic Compass (fundamental foreign and security internal/external strategy for the next 15 years), which was adopted by the EU Council on March 21 this year (General Secretariat of the Council 2022), less than a month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the focus is on increasing the resilience of states and societies to foreign information manipulation and interference in political processes, as well as broadening the EU's ability to support its member states in responding to crises caused by hybrid methods. This is the purpose of the EU Hybrid Toolbox, the exact shape of which will be worked out in the coming months.

The catalogue of hybrid methods and tactics includes disinformation and propaganda activities, cyberattacks, interference in political processes (e.g., elections and referendums), economic pressure, instrumentalization of irregular migration, state support of armed groups, employment of mercenaries, intelligence operations involving sabotage or subversion, radicalization, terrorist activities, and the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Since 2015, the EU has experienced hostile hybrid activity primarily from Russia. To a lesser extent, but with a clear upward trend, such methods are also used by China, Belarus, Iran, and North Korea, as well as by terrorist organizations and radical groups.

It is important to underline that hybrid methods can be used to varying extents and varying intensities and can be freely combined by state or non-state aggressors whose *modus operandi* are not the same. Moreover, the catalogue of hybrid warfare tools is “open” in nature. In the view of EU institutions, given the increasing political rivalries with Russia (especially after the invasion of Ukraine), the EU has been mobilizing its resources and creating new instruments to combat hybrid threats. We need to ensure a trans-sectoral approach to countering radicalization-driven terrorism, taking into account its multiple structural socioeconomic, ideological, and geopolitical roots and contexts, as well as how these factors interact (Jurczyszyn, Liedel, Pacewicz, Piasecka 2019: 39).

In addition, the response to current hybrid threats driven by the radicalization process should be more global, for instance at the EU level. Such cooperation is relatively well developed in the sphere of counter-terrorism (e.g., in intelligence data sharing) but far less so when it comes to countering radicalization. This should change, especially when foreign powers try to destabilize the Union. The EU plays an important role as a creator of cooperation standards, shaping common approaches and threat awareness, and as a facilitator of policies (it is often the source of financing).

This is exemplified by the Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns on vaccination during the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, issues related to environmental protection can be used to create social polarization and divisions within the EU. Climate change, in turn, can contribute to the destabilization of the Union's southern neighborhood, migration crises, and the rise of terrorist organizations. The instrumentalization of these phenomena by external actors (e.g., creating routes for the smuggling of irregular migrants or inspiring radicals to carry out terrorist attacks) poses a direct threat to EU states.

The catalogue of hybrid threats is also broadened by emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), including the development of artificial intelligence, which will provide advanced technical capabilities for disinformation and propaganda campaigns, as well as intelligence and subversion activities. These considerations make it much more difficult to develop procedures for responding to various hybrid attack scenarios. Due to their cross-border and networked nature, hybrid threats require a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to early detection, counteraction, and emergency response.

It is therefore extremely important to build the resilience of EU states and their societies, to reduce their vulnerability to hostile disinformation and propaganda, and strengthen the protection of critical infrastructure against cyberattacks, terrorism, subversion, and sabotage. The Strategic Compass devotes particular attention to strengthening the EU's resilience against foreign information manipulation and interference in political processes (General Secretariat of the Council 2022).

Even before the Compass, the EU was taking into account the rise of hybrid threats. In July 2020, the Commission adopted the Security Union Strategy for 2020-2025. This aimed to support member states in the fight against evolving threats and in building long-term resilience by tackling classic and hybrid threats in the physical and digital environments. Its assumptions are grouped around four pillars aimed at en-



hancing the security environment, improving the activities of law enforcement, protecting against terrorism and organized crime, and strengthening the European security system.

The implementation of the strategy was consistent with the new Counter-Terrorism Agenda, adopted in December 2020, which organizes and complements previous actions at the EU and member state levels (Kozioł 2021). We can find there the key challenge: in response to the existing terrorist threat, the agenda offers new solutions to increase the effectiveness of cooperation between EU bodies and member states' services. However, the challenge will be to reach a consensus around the Digital Services Act (DSA), which would regulate, among other things, the level of responsibility of platforms to remove and combat terrorist and extremist content online.

It is therefore unclear how the EU would react to, for example, a series of subversion and sabotage operations (e.g., against the arms sector providing weapons or systems to Ukraine), and whether such events would be considered as armed aggression. Equally importantly, the Compass does not develop politico-military mechanisms for responding to a full-scale armed conflict preceded by hostile hybrid action, thus leaving the lead role to NATO to ensure collective defense capability. The EU's approach to combating hybrid threats focuses only on their non-military dimension (i.e., disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks). This is insufficient for developing a military response capability for the full spectrum of hybrid methods (including military or paramilitary).

That is why, from this perspective, NATO's role seems to be a crucial one. On June 29, 2022, the Alliance adopted a new strategic concept, in which we can find the statement that hybrid actions by their nature are activities conducted below the threshold of war, which create the risk of a non-universal interpretation, and consequent dilatory action or inaction (NATO 2022).

Therefore, NATO states that current authoritarian regimes interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of

our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalize migration, manipulate energy supplies, and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance (*Ibidem*).

In particular, the Russian Federation represents a significant direct threat to the Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression, and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber, and hybrid means against us and our partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric, and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order (*Ibidem*).

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About the book "The Virus of Radicalization":

"I regard this monograph as an example of high-quality academic craftsmanship. It is an important supplement to the literature on the phenomena and processes of radicalization and extremism (primarily those taking place in the Polish socio-political system, but not only). It will be interesting both for scientists, students and a wider audience interested in socio-political issues."

Associate Professor Mikołaj Cześnik, Ph.D., SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw, Poland

"The volume is a collection of chapters on the topic of mostly right-wing political radicalization in Poland, Europe, and the world. (...) Excellent empirical case studies of particular cases of political radicalization in Poland and Europe are the bulk and the highlight of the volume. (...) Overall, the volume is a useful, well-written and well-conceived contribution to literature on political radicalism and crisis of liberal democracy."

Jacek Lubecki, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA, USA

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